Catalonia, Scotland and the EU

By Ferran Requejo
The political process “Catalonia, new state in Europe” is about to enter a second phase. The first phase, that of pro-independence characterized by the leadership of Catalan civil society organizations (Òmnium, the Catalan National Assembly, the consultations held in municipalities throughout Catalonia, etc.), will end on November 25^th when the Catalans go to the polls. This first phase began with the July 2010 demonstration-response to the ruling of the Spanish Constitutional Court on the Catalan Statute of Autonomy, a relatively modest text that had been ratified in a referendum by the citizens of Catalonia. As different studies have shown, support for independence over these last twenty-eight months has not stopped growing, to the point that became the unquestionable expression of the massive demonstration on September 11^th, 2012.
After November 25th we will enter a new phase of independence, led by the country’s institutions (Government and Parliament) and its political parties. This second phase will have two stages to it. The first will be the period between the elections and the holding of a referendum/consultation. The second, if the “yes” option were to win, would go from the referendum to the formalization of the new Catalan state. For each of these two stages there are different tasks to be carried out, and we should not mix up the objectives and their respective strategies. One of the aspects that generates the most confusion today is Catalonia’s adhesion to the European Union in the case of a “yes” vote in the referendum. Let’s take a look at how this particular issue is handled in the case of Scotland-United Kingdom, and we can use the two aforementioned phases as a basis for our comparison.
The elections-referendum phase. It seems quite clear that the EU does not have a fixed position on processes of “internal enlargement.” It is also clear that the Scottish and Catalan cases are protagonized by European citizens (who have been so for 40 years in the case of Scotland, and 26 in the case of Catalonia). Nonetheless, we can see a stark contrast between Scotland and Catalonia regarding two basic aspects. The first is that Scottish citizens are legally guaranteed the right to express their opinion in a democratic referendum, planned for the autumn of 2014, about whether they prefer to remain within the United Kingdom or build a new State. In exchange, the citizens of Catalonia suffer from a constitutional framework that prevents them from exercising this right. It can be expected, therefore, that the Catalan consultation will have to take place within an international legal framework. The Catalan and Scottish cases also differ in that, while the polls indicate that the majority of Scottish citizens are in favor of continuing within the United Kingdom, in Catalonia it is quite feasible that a majority of citizens will support the forming a Catalan state. What one group has, the other lacks.
In terms of democracy, modernity, rights and respect for internal pluralism, the contrast couldn’t be any starker between the British and Spanish policies. While the Scots will be preparing for the referendum over the next few years, debating the pros and cons of each position, in Catalonia the main task will be to ensure that the consultation can take place, especially considering the hostility of the Spanish constitutional framework. A fundamental objective of the next Catalan Government will be to ensure that the referendum takes place, and with all the procedural and legal guarantees that would give it full legitimacy on an international level. To achieve this objective the Catalan Government will be collaborating with and counting on the support of the  citizenry and civil society. Throughout this phase both the Scots and the Catalans will continue to be citizens of the EU.
The phase of the referendum-formal declaration of the new State. In the Scottish case, the post-referendum process is described in detail in different reports (for example, take a look at the one signed by Graham Avery, decision-maker and expert on European matters; session 2012-13, HC 643, accessible on the homepage of the British Parliament; let me repeat this, not the Scottish Parliament, but the British one!). The text is emphatic about how irrational and unrealistic it would be to assume that Scotland would be kicked out of the EU to then be admitted again shortly afterward. It also takes as a given that after the referendum a simplified procedure would be used for Scotland’s adhesion as a new member of the EU (a simplified —and speeded-up— procedure was also used in the case of unified Germany). It is a very different procedure from that of the adhesion of new members to the EU. Scotland, as they say, is not Turkey. There are European citizenry rights that have to be respected. Anything else would be contradictory to the values of the European Union. The modifications to be made to the treaties would be minimal (decisions on the number of MEPs, votes in the Council, etc.).
This procedure would be carried out at the same time as the governments of London and Edinburgh are negotiating the specific terms of the separation. In this second transitory phase it’s possible that certain formulas for Scotland’s participation in the EU could be adopted, such as having a voice without a vote in the Council, representation in the inter-governmental conferences, a delegate in the Commission, etc. Thus, at the end of this phase we would witness, simultaneously, the formal declaration of independence and full access to the EU.
After the referendum, Catalonia’s case could be regulated with a similar procedure.  This is why I have proposed that the referendum in Catalonia should be held on the same day as the Scottish referendum. It would be the Scot-Cat referendum day. As a result, the process would be Europeanized automatically. And the EU’s answer would have to be the same for both cases.